Preferences, Selection, and the Structure of Teacher Pay
icpsr_198086
Andrew C. Johnston (2025). American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2025, 17(3): 310–346
DOI: 10.1257/app.20210763
| field | value |
|---|---|
| venue | American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2025, 17(3): 310–346 |
| paper | 10.1257/app.20210763 |
| replication data | openICPSR 198086 |
| data license | CC BY 4.0 (openICPSR project page 198086 (maintainer-read 2026-07-20)) — “This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) License.” |
| regression datasets (in this corpus) | 3 |
| graduated / eligible / exported | 3 / 5 / 114 (policy claims_manual_regression_cap) |
| routed / gap / residue (at source) | 26 / 48 / 0 |
Claims & tasks
Every claim the paper makes in its main body about a parameter, joined to the benchmark task (dataset · coefficient) that captures it. The effect, s.e. and p are the captured regression's own reported values (the paper's Stata figures, carrying the paper's SE method); the row shows the paper's verbatim quote (page · exhibit), so you can confirm the regression matches what the paper says. The prominence column is the within-study inclusion signal (⭐ headline → primary → secondary). The sensitivity column is the privacy level of the most-sensitive variable in the regression (🔴 high / 🟠 medium / ⚪ low).
| # | prominence | sensitivity | claim | effect | s.e. | p | task | instance (dataset · coef) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| C1 | ⭐ primary | 🟠 medium | “High-quality teachers do not, for instance, have a stronger preference for more generous pensions, higher salary, or high-performing students.” — p. 18 “In terms of work setting characteristics that policymakers can influence, effective teachers have the same preferences as other teachers with regards to class size, salary, income growth, insurance subsidies, retirement benefits, and supportive principals.” — p. 18 Table 4, col 1 (Choice (1)) |
+0.011 | 0.009 | 0.218 | Linear Regression | reg_71 · sal_va_math_4n=10398 · d=17 |
| C2 | ⭐ primary | 🟠 medium | In terms of work setting characteristics that policymakers can influence, effective teachers have the same preferences as other teachers with regards to class size, salary, income growth, insurance subsidies, retirement benefits, and supportive principals. p. 18 · Table 4, col 1 (Choice (1)) |
-0.038 | 0.098 | 0.696 | Linear Regression | reg_71 · deduct_va_math_4n=10398 · d=17 |
| C3 | ⭐ primary | 🟠 medium | In terms of work setting characteristics that policymakers can influence, effective teachers have the same preferences as other teachers with regards to class size, salary, income growth, insurance subsidies, retirement benefits, and supportive principals. p. 18 · Table 4, col 1 (Choice (1)) |
+0.083 | 0.072 | 0.246 | Linear Regression | reg_71 · prem_va_math_4n=10398 · d=17 |
| C4 | ⭐ primary | 🟠 medium | In terms of work setting characteristics that policymakers can influence, effective teachers have the same preferences as other teachers with regards to class size, salary, income growth, insurance subsidies, retirement benefits, and supportive principals. p. 18 · Table 4, col 1 (Choice (1)) |
+0.018 | 0.023 | 0.430 | Linear Regression | reg_71 · growth_va_math_4n=10398 · d=17 |
| C5 | ⭐ primary | 🟠 medium | “The only way in which high-performing teachers systematically differ is their preferences for offers including performance pay (Table 4 and Figure 5).” — p. 18 “If teachers entertained two comparable offers, a high-performing teacher (top decile) is 23 percent more likely than a bottom-decile one to select the offer providing an additional $3,000 in merit pay per year.” — p. 20 Table 4, col 1 (Choice (1)) |
+0.040 | 0.015 | 0.008 | Linear Regression | reg_71 · reward_va_math_4n=10398 · d=17 |
| C6 | ⭐ primary | 🟠 medium | In terms of work setting characteristics that policymakers can influence, effective teachers have the same preferences as other teachers with regards to class size, salary, income growth, insurance subsidies, retirement benefits, and supportive principals. p. 18 · Table 4, col 1 (Choice (1)) |
-0.005 | 0.041 | 0.909 | Linear Regression | reg_71 · retire_va_math_4n=10398 · d=17 |
| C7 | ⭐ primary | 🟠 medium | “In terms of work setting characteristics that policymakers can influence, effective teachers have the same preferences as other teachers with regards to class size, salary, income growth, insurance subsidies, retirement benefits, and supportive principals.” — p. 18 “High-quality teachers do not, for instance, have a stronger preference for more generous pensions, higher salary, or high-performing students.” — p. 18 Table 4, col 1 (Choice (1)) |
+0.001 | 0.002 | 0.678 | Linear Regression | reg_71 · replace_va_math_4n=10398 · d=17 |
| C8 | ⭐ primary | 🟠 medium | “High-quality teachers do not, for instance, have a stronger preference for more generous pensions, higher salary, or high-performing students.” — p. 18 “In terms of work setting characteristics that policymakers can influence, effective teachers have the same preferences as other teachers with regards to class size, salary, income growth, insurance subsidies, retirement benefits, and supportive principals.” — p. 18 Table 4, col 2 (Choice (2)) |
+0.010 | 0.016 | 0.522 | Linear Regression | reg_72 · sal_va_read_4n=10398 · d=17 |
| C9 | ⭐ primary | 🟠 medium | In terms of work setting characteristics that policymakers can influence, effective teachers have the same preferences as other teachers with regards to class size, salary, income growth, insurance subsidies, retirement benefits, and supportive principals. p. 18 · Table 4, col 2 (Choice (2)) |
-0.306 | 0.163 | 0.060 | Linear Regression | reg_72 · deduct_va_read_4n=10398 · d=17 |
| C10 | ⭐ primary | 🟠 medium | In terms of work setting characteristics that policymakers can influence, effective teachers have the same preferences as other teachers with regards to class size, salary, income growth, insurance subsidies, retirement benefits, and supportive principals. p. 18 · Table 4, col 2 (Choice (2)) |
+0.135 | 0.118 | 0.255 | Linear Regression | reg_72 · prem_va_read_4n=10398 · d=17 |
| C11 | ⭐ primary | 🟠 medium | In terms of work setting characteristics that policymakers can influence, effective teachers have the same preferences as other teachers with regards to class size, salary, income growth, insurance subsidies, retirement benefits, and supportive principals. p. 18 · Table 4, col 2 (Choice (2)) |
+0.047 | 0.036 | 0.191 | Linear Regression | reg_72 · growth_va_read_4n=10398 · d=17 |
| C12 | ⭐ primary | 🟠 medium | “The only way in which high-performing teachers systematically differ is their preferences for offers including performance pay (Table 4 and Figure 5).” — p. 18 “If teachers entertained two comparable offers, a high-performing teacher (top decile) is 23 percent more likely than a bottom-decile one to select the offer providing an additional $3,000 in merit pay per year.” — p. 20 Table 4, col 2 (Choice (2)) |
+0.055 | 0.025 | 0.028 | Linear Regression | reg_72 · reward_va_read_4n=10398 · d=17 |
| C13 | ⭐ primary | 🟠 medium | In terms of work setting characteristics that policymakers can influence, effective teachers have the same preferences as other teachers with regards to class size, salary, income growth, insurance subsidies, retirement benefits, and supportive principals. p. 18 · Table 4, col 2 (Choice (2)) |
-0.006 | 0.067 | 0.926 | Linear Regression | reg_72 · retire_va_read_4n=10398 · d=17 |
| C14 | ⭐ primary | 🟠 medium | “In terms of work setting characteristics that policymakers can influence, effective teachers have the same preferences as other teachers with regards to class size, salary, income growth, insurance subsidies, retirement benefits, and supportive principals.” — p. 18 “High-quality teachers do not, for instance, have a stronger preference for more generous pensions, higher salary, or high-performing students.” — p. 18 Table 4, col 2 (Choice (2)) |
-0.002 | 0.003 | 0.457 | Linear Regression | reg_72 · replace_va_read_4n=10398 · d=17 |
| C15 | ⭐ primary | 🟠 medium | “High-quality teachers do not, for instance, have a stronger preference for more generous pensions, higher salary, or high-performing students.” — p. 18 “In terms of work setting characteristics that policymakers can influence, effective teachers have the same preferences as other teachers with regards to class size, salary, income growth, insurance subsidies, retirement benefits, and supportive principals.” — p. 18 Table 4, col 3 (Choice (3)) |
-0.002 | 0.001 | 0.015 | Linear Regression | reg_73 · sal_danielson_totaln=18838 · d=17 |
| C16 | ⭐ primary | 🟠 medium | In terms of work setting characteristics that policymakers can influence, effective teachers have the same preferences as other teachers with regards to class size, salary, income growth, insurance subsidies, retirement benefits, and supportive principals. p. 18 · Table 4, col 3 (Choice (3)) |
+0.001 | 0.010 | 0.937 | Linear Regression | reg_73 · deduct_danielson_totaln=18838 · d=17 |
| C17 | ⭐ primary | 🟠 medium | In terms of work setting characteristics that policymakers can influence, effective teachers have the same preferences as other teachers with regards to class size, salary, income growth, insurance subsidies, retirement benefits, and supportive principals. p. 18 · Table 4, col 3 (Choice (3)) |
-0.002 | 0.008 | 0.817 | Linear Regression | reg_73 · prem_danielson_totaln=18838 · d=17 |
| C18 | ⭐ primary | 🟠 medium | In terms of work setting characteristics that policymakers can influence, effective teachers have the same preferences as other teachers with regards to class size, salary, income growth, insurance subsidies, retirement benefits, and supportive principals. p. 18 · Table 4, col 3 (Choice (3)) |
-0.001 | 0.003 | 0.607 | Linear Regression | reg_73 · growth_danielson_totaln=18838 · d=17 |
| C19 | ⭐ primary | 🟠 medium | “The only way in which high-performing teachers systematically differ is their preferences for offers including performance pay (Table 4 and Figure 5).” — p. 18 “If teachers entertained two comparable offers, a high-performing teacher (top decile) is 23 percent more likely than a bottom-decile one to select the offer providing an additional $3,000 in merit pay per year.” — p. 20 Table 4, col 3 (Choice (3)) |
+0.005 | 0.002 | 0.002 | Linear Regression | reg_73 · reward_danielson_totaln=18838 · d=17 |
| C20 | ⭐ primary | 🟠 medium | In terms of work setting characteristics that policymakers can influence, effective teachers have the same preferences as other teachers with regards to class size, salary, income growth, insurance subsidies, retirement benefits, and supportive principals. p. 18 · Table 4, col 3 (Choice (3)) |
+0.005 | 0.004 | 0.276 | Linear Regression | reg_73 · retire_danielson_totaln=18838 · d=17 |
| C21 | ⭐ primary | 🟠 medium | “In terms of work setting characteristics that policymakers can influence, effective teachers have the same preferences as other teachers with regards to class size, salary, income growth, insurance subsidies, retirement benefits, and supportive principals.” — p. 18 “High-quality teachers do not, for instance, have a stronger preference for more generous pensions, higher salary, or high-performing students.” — p. 18 Table 4, col 3 (Choice (3)) |
+0.000 | 0.000 | 0.040 | Linear Regression | reg_73 · replace_danielson_totaln=18838 · d=17 |
Regression datasets
The 3 regression dataset(s) graduated into the benchmark corpus from this study's replication package — each backs one or more claims above. Expand each for its features, response, (sound, data-independent) public bounds, and reproduction grade.
icpsr_198086_reg_71 — point ~ va_math_4 + sal + sal_va_math_4 + deduct + deduct_va_math_4 + prem + prem_va_math…
Sensitivity proposal: 🟠 medium maximum across columns (advisory; reviewed manually).
Reproduction grade: ✅ match (benchmark-eligible).
Features
| name | description | type | sensitivity | bound lo | bound hi | estimate | s.e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
va_math_4 |
Teacher's math value-added score, grade 4 | continuous | 🟠 medium | -12.0 | 12.0 | -0.6589 | 0.436 |
sal |
Job scenario: salary level attribute | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | +0.09149 | 0.00374 |
sal_va_math_4 |
Salary attribute x math value-added interaction | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | +0.01097 | 0.0089 |
deduct |
Job scenario: insurance premium deduction attribute | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | -0.5081 | 0.0582 |
deduct_va_math_4 |
Deduction attribute x math value-added interaction | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | -0.03822 | 0.0977 |
prem |
Job scenario: insurance premium level attribute | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | -0.05044 | 0.0241 |
prem_va_math_4 |
Premium attribute x math value-added interaction | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | +0.08341 | 0.0718 |
growth |
Job scenario: salary growth rate attribute | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | +0.1829 | 0.0122 |
growth_va_math_4 |
Salary growth attribute x math value-added interaction | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | +0.01829 | 0.0232 |
reward |
Job scenario: merit pay bonus attribute | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | +0.04552 | 0.0059 |
reward_va_math_4 |
Reward attribute x math value-added interaction | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | +0.04043 | 0.0152 |
rating_num |
Job scenario: number of evaluation rating categories | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | -0.07118 | 0.0247 |
rating_va_math_4 |
Rating attribute x math value-added interaction | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | -0.02464 | 0.038 |
retire_num |
Job scenario: retirement benefit level attribute | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | +0.06089 | 0.0177 |
retire_va_math_4 |
Retirement attribute x math value-added interaction | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | -0.004688 | 0.0412 |
replace |
Job scenario: dismissal/replacement risk attribute | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | +0.01356 | 0.000937 |
replace_va_math_4 |
Replacement-risk attribute x math value-added interaction | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | +0.0007522 | 0.00181 |
Response
| name | description | type | sensitivity | bound lo | bound hi | estimate | s.e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
point |
Teacher's stated preference points for job offer | continuous | ⚪ low | -100.0 | 100.0 | — | — |
Public bounds (data-independent) sourced from: point-allocation conjoint response, conventionally sums to 100; value-added measures conventionally reported as standardized (SD) scores.
n = 10,398 samples.
icpsr_198086_reg_72 — point ~ va_read_4 + sal + sal_va_read_4 + deduct + deduct_va_read_4 + prem + prem_va_read…
Sensitivity proposal: 🟠 medium maximum across columns (advisory; reviewed manually).
Reproduction grade: ✅ match (benchmark-eligible).
Features
| name | description | type | sensitivity | bound lo | bound hi | estimate | s.e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
va_read_4 |
Teacher's reading value-added score, grade 4 | continuous | 🟠 medium | -12.0 | 12.0 | -0.1613 | 0.778 |
sal |
Job scenario: salary level attribute | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | +0.09178 | 0.00372 |
sal_va_read_4 |
Salary attribute x reading value-added interaction | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | +0.01004 | 0.0157 |
deduct |
Job scenario: insurance premium deduction attribute | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | -0.5067 | 0.0578 |
deduct_va_read_4 |
Deduction attribute x reading value-added interaction | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | -0.3064 | 0.163 |
prem |
Job scenario: insurance premium level attribute | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | -0.04862 | 0.024 |
prem_va_read_4 |
Premium attribute x reading value-added interaction | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | +0.1349 | 0.118 |
growth |
Job scenario: salary growth rate attribute | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | +0.1834 | 0.012 |
growth_va_read_4 |
Salary growth attribute x reading value-added interaction | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | +0.04724 | 0.0361 |
reward |
Job scenario: merit pay bonus attribute | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | +0.047 | 0.00586 |
reward_va_read_4 |
Reward attribute x reading value-added interaction | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | +0.05457 | 0.0248 |
rating_num |
Job scenario: number of evaluation rating categories | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | -0.07187 | 0.0246 |
rating_va_read_4 |
Rating attribute x reading value-added interaction | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | -0.02534 | 0.0586 |
retire_num |
Job scenario: retirement benefit level attribute | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | +0.06156 | 0.0175 |
retire_va_read_4 |
Retirement attribute x reading value-added interaction | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | -0.00625 | 0.067 |
replace |
Job scenario: dismissal/replacement risk attribute | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | +0.01362 | 0.000931 |
replace_va_read_4 |
Replacement-risk attribute x reading value-added interaction | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | -0.00242 | 0.00325 |
Response
| name | description | type | sensitivity | bound lo | bound hi | estimate | s.e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
point |
Teacher's stated preference points for job offer | continuous | ⚪ low | -100.0 | 100.0 | — | — |
Public bounds (data-independent) sourced from: point-allocation conjoint response, conventionally sums to 100; value-added measures conventionally reported as standardized (SD) scores.
n = 10,398 samples.
icpsr_198086_reg_73 — point ~ danielson_total + sal + sal_danielson_total + deduct + deduct_danielson_total + p…
Sensitivity proposal: 🟠 medium maximum across columns (advisory; reviewed manually).
Reproduction grade: ✅ match (benchmark-eligible).
Features
| name | description | type | sensitivity | bound lo | bound hi | estimate | s.e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
danielson_total |
Teacher's total Danielson evaluation framework score | continuous | 🟠 medium | — | — | +0.09059 | 0.0496 |
sal |
Job scenario: salary level attribute | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | +0.08573 | 0.00278 |
sal_danielson_total |
Salary attribute x Danielson score interaction | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | -0.002376 | 0.00098 |
deduct |
Job scenario: insurance premium deduction attribute | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | -0.5489 | 0.0423 |
deduct_danielson_total |
Deduction attribute x Danielson score interaction | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | +0.0007789 | 0.00979 |
prem |
Job scenario: insurance premium level attribute | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | -0.09036 | 0.0179 |
prem_danielson_total |
Premium attribute x Danielson score interaction | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | -0.001773 | 0.00767 |
growth |
Job scenario: salary growth rate attribute | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | +0.1845 | 0.00923 |
growth_danielson_total |
Salary growth attribute x Danielson score interaction | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | -0.001377 | 0.00268 |
reward |
Job scenario: merit pay bonus attribute | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | +0.02652 | 0.00449 |
reward_danielson_total |
Reward attribute x Danielson score interaction | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | +0.005326 | 0.00172 |
rating_num |
Job scenario: number of evaluation rating categories | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | -0.07503 | 0.0184 |
rating_danielson_total |
Evaluation rating attribute x Danielson score interaction | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | -0.001084 | 0.00424 |
retire_num |
Job scenario: retirement benefit level attribute | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | +0.07628 | 0.0128 |
retire_danielson_total |
Retirement-benefit attribute x Danielson score interaction | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | +0.004674 | 0.00429 |
replace |
Job scenario: dismissal/replacement risk attribute | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | +0.01425 | 0.000685 |
replace_danielson_total |
Replacement-risk attribute x Danielson score interaction | continuous | ⚪ low | — | — | +0.0004368 | 0.000213 |
Response
| name | description | type | sensitivity | bound lo | bound hi | estimate | s.e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
point |
Teacher's stated preference points for job offer | continuous | ⚪ low | -100.0 | 100.0 | — | — |
Public bounds (data-independent) sourced from: point-allocation conjoint response, conventionally sums to 100.
n = 18,838 samples.